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Abstract: This paper examines the magnitude of the reporting bias 
inherent in the historical cost accounting of a firm's physical 
capital. Reported depreciation data pertaining to U.S. Steel Corpo-
ration (currently USX) between 1939 and 1987 are compared with 
standardized historical cost figures and replacement cost esti-
mates. The findings suggest that replacement cost depreciation 
would have provided more information about U.S. Steel's ability to 
maintain its productive capacity than historical cost depreciation 
did. Thus, this analysis provides an illustration of one of the 
primary arguments for replacement cost accounting. 
Changing prices have created accounting measurement 
problems for business enterprises throughout the twentieth 
century. Paton [1922] noted that in periods of sweeping price 
changes the accountants ' yardstick (money) becomes "an un-
stable, variable unit; and comparisons of unadjusted accounting 
statements prepared at intervals are accordingly always more 
or less unsatisfactory and are often positively misleading . . . 
When prices on all sides are climbing sharply it seems clear that 
a mere increase in the number of dollars possessed is not a valid 
expression of true improvement in economic condition" [pp. 
427-428]. In such periods, Paton pointed out that management 
must be careful not to pursue a dividend policy which threatens 
"the preservation and expansion of the physical capital of the 
enterprise" [p. 440]. 
Paton argued that "by reducing what would otherwise be 
the net income figure," recognition of replacement cost depre-
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ciation would enforce management 's pursuit of a conservative 
dividend policy, and "undoubtedly tend to prevent the dis-
bursement of capital as dividends" [p. 440]. Paton concluded 
that replacement cost data would allow users to better judge 
how successfully management had maintained the existing 
physical capital. 
Even though debate concerning theoretical aspects of re-
placement cost measurement persisted, physical capital con-
tinued to be maintained largely at historical values in financial 
statements. Finally, in 1979, after considerable discussion and 
following a period of persistent price increases, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board mandated in SFAS 33 that re-
placement cost information be disclosed. 
Subsequent replacement cost disclosures, however, were 
apparently neglected by statement users. Managers [Madison 
and Radig, 1983], auditors [Skousen and Albrecht, 1984], and 
professional analysts [Berliner, 1983] reported that they did not 
utilize SFAS 33 data when they evaluated past economic events 
or when they formulated expectations about the future. Recent 
capital market research studies confirm these survey findings. 
Researchers found little evidence that a relationship existed 
between changing price information on a firm level and securi-
ties prices [Beaver and Landsman, 1983] or trading volume [Ro, 
1981], or that SFAS 33 disclosures could be used to predict 
unanticipated dividend changes [Schaefer, 1984 and Murdoch, 
1986] or takeover targets [Bartley and Boardman, 1983]. 
This paper uses an alternative approach to assessing the 
usefulness of replacement cost information. It addresses the 
questions of (1) whether replacement cost depreciation provides 
more information about a company's ability to maintain its 
productive capacity than does historical cost depreciation and 
(2) whether replacement cost measures enhance a user's capa-
bility to perform long-range forecasts and confirm prior expec-
tations. 
The annual reports of U.S. Steel Corporation (currently 
USX) from 1939 through 1987 are used to investigate how 
certain accounting measurement techniques can bias the finan-
cial statement presentation of a firm's physical capital. Spe-
cifically, two series that summarize past investing activities 
are developed. The series are a firm's Net Asset Ratio [(Fixed 
Assets — Accumulated Depreciation)/Fixed Assets] and a firm's 
Annual Replacement Index [(Capital Additions - Depreciation)/ 
Beginning Fixed Assets]. These ratios depict the extent to which 
a company has been able to maintain its capital base in the past 
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and provide an indication of the firm's long range competitive-
ness. 
Actual reported data are compared with standardized his-
torical cost and replacement cost estimates for U.S. Steel over a 
fifty-year period. The comparison highlights the signal differ-
ences that can be created by alternative valuation methods. 
Conceptual implications of the findings also are discussed. 
MODEL 
"Destruction is the law of nature" [Hatfield, 1909, p. 121]. 
Yet accounting for the depreciation of fixed capital has not 
always been so clear cut. In his historical analysis of accounting 
evolution, Littleton [1966] reported that one of the earliest 
English references to depreciation was found in A Brief Instruc-
tion by John Mellis [1588] which suggested a debit entry to the 
profit-and-loss account and a corresponding credit entry to the 
"Implements to householde" "for so much lost by decay of 
household stuff". Similar t reatment subsequently was recom-
mended for horses [Stephen Monteage, Debtor and Creditor Made 
Easie, 1683] and ships [William Jackson, Book-Keeping in the 
True Italian Form, 1801]. The asset account was credited at the 
end of a given period for the current value of the asset in 
question and any remaining difference needed to close the 
account was debited to profit-and-loss. Depreciation apparently 
was not regarded as an expense but was created because of 
"decay from use" [Littleton, 1966, p. 227]. 
The systematic recognition of depreciation did not receive 
much consideration until manufacturing necessitated the pur-
chase of large quantities of plant and equipment and the growth 
of corporations required that a clear distinction be made be-
tween capital and revenue so that net profit could be correctly 
calculated and capital stock could be protected against impair-
ment from dividends [Littleton, 1966, p. 240]. One of the early 
authors to apply depreciation to industry was Ewing Matheson 
in a book entitled The Depreciation of Factories [London, 1884]. 
Since the late 19th century, an argument has persisted 
concerning whether depreciation should result from a cost 
allocation process or an asset valuation process. The side taken 
in this argument can be explained partially by whether one 
wishes to focus upon measuring a flow or valuing a stock. 
Ladelle [1890], who favored the flow concept, argued that 
depreciation should be used to allocate the original cost of an 
asset to the various periods that will benefit from the stream of 
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services produced by the machine. Depreciation, in this in-
stance, represents the systematic matching of a historical cost 
with the revenue that it helps generate [Paton and Littleton, 
1940]. Replacement costs are not particularly relevant. 
Hotelling [1923], in contrast, employed the stock concept to 
develop his model of depreciation. He suggested that the value 
of a machine and the value of a unit of its output are interre-
lated, and historical costs become irrelevant after an asset has 
been purchased. According to Hotelling's stock concept, an asset 
only has value if it can be used in the future. Thus depreciation 
in a given year reflects the periodic change in the current value 
of assets that have not yet been sold or discarded [Hicks, 1969]. 
Replacement costs, in this instance, play an important role in 
the measuring process. 
The stock concept (and thus replacement cost accounting) 
may provide more information than historical costs about a 
company's past success in maintaining its productive capacity. 
Hotelling [1923] argues that a particular capital asset which 
employs old obsolete technology will be replaced by a new 
technology machine if management thinks that the present 
value of the benefits to be derived from the new technology will 
exceed the cost of purchasing such a machine. If the purchase of 
new technology cannot be justified economically, however, 
production will not immediately cease. Old technology firms 
will continue to profitably produce output with the capital in 
place as long as the present value of the future net revenues 
(sales price minus variable costs) exceeds the present value of 
any positive salvage value to be collected at the termination of 
the old technology. Variable costs will slowly mount as in-
creasingly more frequent and expensive repairs are required to 
keep the old technology assets functional. 
When an entire plant contains old technology and new 
technology is not implemented, the time between deciding to 
terminate old technology operations sometime in the future and 
the actual closing of the plant doors can span decades. The only 
signal that such a decision has occurred may be a decline in new 
capital purchases and a gradual aging in the productive capac-
ity. In this case, replacement costs, not historical costs, provide 
the best indication that disinvestment is occurring. 
Just such an event occurred in the steel industry in the early 
1960s. The influx of foreign imports caused the demand curve 
for the domestic steel industry to shift to the left. This decline in 
demand (from D0 to D1 in Figure 1) caused many domestic steel 
firms to halt preliminary plans to replace their existing capital 
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Figure 1 
Domestic Steel Industry Supply Curve 
D0 = Old demand for steel products before influx of imports 
D1 = New demand for steel products after influx of imports 
FCo = Industry fixed costs (old technology) 
FCp = Industry fixed costs (new technology) 
TCo = Total costs (old technology) 
TCp = Total costs (new technology) 
Qo,Po = Quantity and price of domestic steel produced with old technology 
before influx of imports 
Q1,P1 = Quantity and price of domestic steel produced with old technology 
after influx of imports 
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stock with new technology at a cost of (FCP), because the present 
value of the expected future net revenues to be derived from 
these proposed new investments could no longer be expected to 
cover the projected initial capital outlays. (See Figure 1.) 
CASE DEVELOPMENT 
U.S. Steel has been an acknowledged leader in the devel-
opment of financial reporting.1 As such, the corporation has 
been the focus of historical research. Younkins, Flesher and 
Flesher [1984] utilized the U.S. Steel annual reports issued prior 
to 1952 to illustrate the historical development of financial 
reporting during the first half of the twentieth century. Richard 
Vangermeersch [1971, 1988] utilized the corporate reports to 
trace the historical development of depreciation and to com-
ment on observed changes in the reporting of tangible fixed 
assets. 
Because United States Steel Corporation is a domestic 
leader in what has historically been considered a very capital 
intensive industry, it is also the focus of this study. Throughout 
the fifty-year period encompassed by this study, U.S. Steel's net 
tangible assets represented, on the average, over 55 percent of 
the value of the total reported assets. In such a capital intensive 
company, depreciation measurement plays an important role in 
income determination. 
United States Steel Corporation also provides an excellent 
subject for the study of the predictive value of reported physical 
capacity and related investment numbers, because the company 
underwent significant restructuring in the early 1980s. In 1979, 
U.S. Steel began consolidating under-utilized steel production 
facilities and permanently shutting down obsolete unprofitable 
plants. This action vastly altered the technological structure of 
the company. In 1939, 47.8 percent of the revenues generated 
from the sale of steel products were used to pay employee 
benefits. By 1981, after the initial plant closings, employee 
expenditures as a percent of sales had declined to 36.4 percent. 
In the ensuing six years, additional restructuring enabled U.S. 
Steel to reduce the number of man-hours required to produce 
and ship a ton of steel from 10.8 to less than 4.0. 
1See Financial Accounting Milestones in the Annual Reports of United States 
Steel Corporation: The First Seven Decades, edited by Richard Vangermeersch, 
New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 1986, for extracts of various financial 
reporting milestones over the period 1902-1968. 
6
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 16 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/5
Reed: A Historical Analysis of Depreciation Accounting 125 
Concomitant with the move to eliminate unprofitable steel 
facilities, U.S. Steel began to funnel available resources away 
from steel into oil and gas production activities. This change in 
strategy resulted in the acquisition of Marathon Oil in 1982, the 
purchase of Husky Oil Company in 1984, and the bringing of 
Texas Oil and Gas Corporation into the corporate family in 
1986. 
This case study seeks to identify the point during the fifty-
year span when U.S. Steel's strategic plan of retrenchment in 
steel and expansion into a new industry first could be observed. 
At what point did it become evident that the company had 
compromised its ability to retain its historical share of the 
domestic steel market? Did the reported accounting numbers 
provide any false or misleading signals of shrinkage or expan-
sion in the company's physical capacity to produce steel? 
Measurement of the existing stock (or undepreciated value) 
of capital assets provides a means of ascertaining if a company 
has decided not to replace existing capital stock. If the bundle of 
services embodied in depreciation are not replaced through 
capital reinvestment then the bundle of services available for 
future periods identified as net assets will decline. In periods of 
constant prices, comparison of current capital investments with 
systematic historical cost depreciation can be utilized to ascer-
tain whether the stock of depreciable assets is increasing or 
depleting. Such will not be the case, however, when prices 
change over time. Data that enter the accounting system when 
assets are originally purchased lose their economic significance 
as prices change. When prices are not constant the average asset 
age can only be approximated and disinvestment be uncovered 
if all assets with older price references are adjusted to reflect the 
latest prices and technologies. Net asset values and current 
depreciation must be restated in current prices, which reflect 
technological change, to estimate the enormity of the problem 
facing a particular firm to modernize. 
Three series of accounting numbers pertaining to the valua-
tion and depreciation of plant assets were developed in this 
study to examine changes in physical capacity. The first 
economic series contains actual reported financial data. Infor-
mation pertaining to U.S. Steel's periodic recognition of expired 
capital costs in the form of depreciation, as well as information 
about their annual physical capital acquisitions and disposals, 
were collected from the annual reports generated by the man-
agement of U.S. Steel. Specific segment data derived from the 
10-K reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
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sion were utilized to remove oil and gas capital activities where 
necessary after 1983. 
A second economic series eliminated variations in the re-
ported data created by U.S. Steel utilizing different depreciation 
policies at different points in time. In this series, all assets were 
valued at historical cost and were assumed to lose their full 
economic value over a fifteen-year period.2 Depreciation was 
assumed to be a linear function of time and was recorded on a 
straight-line basis. 
The beginning balance, on January 1, 1939, in Accumulated 
Depreciation of $1 billion was revised upward $796 million to 
reflect the impact of the utilization of a similar fifteen-year life 
assumption on past depreciation recognition.3 The net undepre-
ciated balance of $548 million was amortized for case study 
purposes over the ensuing fourteen years using a sum-of-the-
years-digits method.4 All subsequent purchases of capital assets 
were assumed to possess a useful economic life of fifteen years. 
The above assumptions enable uniform depreciation to be 
recognized on all plant assets acquired by U.S. Steel throughout 
the entire fifty-year period of the study. 
The third economic series generated for this study depicts 
the impact of increasing replacement costs on U.S. Steel's 
physical capital investment policies. Historical cost deprecia-
tion and net plant assets balances valued in historical costs do 
not adequately reflect the long-term effect of increasing con-
struction costs on the ability of a company to maintain a certain 
2A fifteen-year economic life coincided with the actual replacement cost 
observed in the Japanese steel industry after World War II and roughly 
corresponded to the apparent shutdown policy employed by U.S. Steel in the 
early eighties. If the assumption is made that plant assets become obsolete and 
are discarded on a first-in-first-out basis, the oldest assets that continued to be 
operational after the last plant closings were finalized in 1987, must have been 
purchased no earlier than mid-1969 and thus were less than twenty years old. 
3Average capital additions during the initial five-year period of the study 
(1939-1944) totaled $78,250 per year. If additions of a similar magnitude had 
occurred with similar frequency in the years preceding the start of the period 
under investigation, it would have taken approximately thirty years to ac-
cumulate the gross Fixed Asset balance at January 1, 1939 of $2.3 billion. Based 
on this assumption and again utilizing a fifteen-year useful economic life, 
sixteen years of capital additions averaging $78,250 would have been fully 
depreciated by January 1, 1939, and fourteen years of similar acquisitions would 
have been partially depreciated. 
4This amortization reflects the results of the assumption that identical 
capital additions had been made in each of the years prior to the start of the 
study and that all capital assets are completely depreciated over a fifteen-year 
period using a straight-line method. 
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level of service potential. In a given year, net service potential 
embodied in current plant additions may not completely re-
place the service potential consumed through production ac-
tivities. Yet, because prices have steadily increased over time, 
the dollars paid for plant additions may greatly exceed the 
dollar valuation assigned to historical cost depreciation. 
To standardize the dollar value assigned to undepreciated 
plant capacity, all historical costs utilized in the second 
economic series were restated to reflect current replacement 
costs. Historical acquisition costs were revised annually to 
reflect current replacement costs in a given year. An externally 
generated specific price index was used to perform the conver-
sion as follows: 
Replacement Cost Historical Current Index 
in Year t + n Cost of in Year t + n 
of Acquis i t ion i = Acquis i t ion i x 
Purchased in Year t Purchased in Year t Historical Index 
in Year t 
The ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD (ENR) construction 
cost index was utilized to convert historical cost dollars to 
replacement cost dollars. The ENR construction cost index was 
created in 1921 to diagnose price changes that occurred during 
and immediately following World War I and to evaluate their 
effect on construction costs. The index, which is composed of 
constant quantities of structural steel, portland cement, lumber, 
and common labor, is designed to measure the effects of wage 
rate and materials price trends. 
The ENR construction cost index was selected over the 
producer's price index (PPI) for three reasons. (1) The PPI does 
not include labor, which is a vital part of the construction 
business. (2) The PPI includes many items such as food which 
are unrelated to the construction business. (3) The ENR con-
struction cost index is less volatile and better reflects changes in 
capital spending. Table 1 contains a summary of the ENR 
construction cost index for the years 1939 through 1987. 
COMPARISON OF DEPRECIATION RECOGNITION 
Actual Reported Depreciation 
One of the goals of depreciation accounting is to distribute 
the cost of a capital asset over the estimated period that the unit 
will provide economic usefulness to the firm so that the periodic 
expiration is systematically and rationally matched against the 
9
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Table 1 
Engineering News Record Construction Cost Index 
1939-1987 
Index Range Average 
Years From To Annual Change 
1939-1947 236 413 9.37% 
1948-1957 413 724 7.53% 
1958-1967 724 1070 4.78% 
1968-1977 1070 2577 14.08% 
1978-1987 2577 4401 7.08% 
periodic revenue generated by the asset. Physical factors such as 
wear and tear from operation, the action of time and other 
elements, and deterioration and decay, as well as functional 
factors such as obsolescence and supersession, place limits on 
the economic usefulness of an operational asset and ideally will 
be reflected in the periodic apportionment of asset cost. 
Table 2 summarizes the various methods employed by U.S. 
Steel to record depreciation expense throughout the fifty-year 
period. 
Examination of the various depreciation policies followed 
by U.S. Steel over the past fifty years suggest that the vagarities 
of the current income tax law, not changes in plant capacity 
utilization, governed the periodic corporate recognition of 
depreciation.5 Emergency facilities constructed during World 
War II and the Korean Conflict costing $186,544,000 and 
$812,854,000, respectively, were rapidly amortized over five-
year periods. Later, in 1962, the IRS Revenue Procedure 62-21 
allowed U.S. Steel to inaugurate the use of an accelerated 
method of recognizing depreciation on its assets for tax pur-
poses. Management decided "after careful study of the new 
procedure as applied to its own properties", to base "its deter-
mination of the wear and exhaustion of facilities on the 
guideline procedure" [U.S. Steel, 1962, p. 5]. This move in-
creased depreciation which reduced accounting profits avail-
able for distribution as dividends. The 20 percent double-the-
declining-balance method was utilized for the next six years. 
5Vangermeersch [1971, p.70] came to the same conclusion. He noted, "As tax 
accounting depreciation methods and the replacement-cost and accelerated 
methods became the financial accounting depreciation methods for U.S. Steel, 
the yearly depreciation amount became more and more the result of an 
arbitrary and inflexible formula geared not to production but to tax and other 
considerations." 
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In 1968, " to enhance the comparability of financial state-
ments in the steel industry" [U.S. Steel, 1968, p. 4], U.S. Steel 
revised the lives of certain properties and returned to a 
straight-line method of recording depreciation. Current tax law 
again played a role in the magnitude of the periodic charge. The 
midpoint lives provided by the IRS Asset Depreciation Range 
System served as the range over which depreciation was to be 
recognized for a particular asset. Depreciable lives remained 
unchanged until 1979 when most were reduced. This revision of 
economic lives, however, could be labeled, "Too little, too late." 
In the fourth quarter of 1979, U.S. Steel announced the perma-
nent shutdown of several steel and nonsteel plants and wrote 
down depreciable assets a total of $218.7 million to their 
estimated recoverable value. Sales revenues from these opera-
tions amounted to only about 5 percent of total sales, but the 
plant closings impacted more than 11,000 employees. 
The 1979 downward adjustment was followed by four 
similar announcements over the next seven years. In 1981, 
management suggested that the facility shutdowns were only 
temporary, and were caused by "a recession compounded by 
excessive steel imports" [U.S. Steel, 1981, p. 3]. 
However, by 1982, the production suspensions were no 
longer considered temporary. Management blamed "sagging 
demand" and a company desire to "reduce costs and improve 
operating efficiencies, quality control and customer service" for 
the realignment of and curtailment of a number of plants [U.S. 
Steel, 1982, p. 4]. The next series of plant shutdowns occurred in 
1983. Management reported, "In December we moved to pre-
serve the best and most modern of our tools of production, to 
close or downsize certain operations and to consolidate others. 
And we struck a balance between products for the capital goods 
market and those for consumer-oriented markets, shifting our 
emphasis to flat rolled steels for automobiles and appliances, 
seamless pipe for the oil and gas industries and heavy plates and 
beams for construction" [U.S. Steel, 1983, p. 2]. 
In 1987, at the end of a six-month strike, U.S. Steel an-
nounced that it would not restart most of the facilities at 
Baytown, Texas and Provo, Utah. "We are not giving up any 
capacity to put product in the marketplace from where we were 
before the strike" [Wall Street Journal, February 5, 1987, p. 4]. 
The total recognition of the presence of obsolete, worn out, 
and unneeded physical capacity ultimately amounted to $1,347 
billion dollars. This succession of chargeoffs eliminated over 10 
percent of the gross carrying value of the physical assets re-
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ported at the beginning of 1979 and reduced capacity almost 50 
percent. 
Statement users were forewarned that problems were 
mounting. Throughout the forty-year period leading up to the 
series of write-downs, U.S. Steel management persistently ad-
monished readers in the annual reports that allowable deprecia-
tion charges were inadequate, effective tax rates too high, and 
that company resources were simply not available to maintain a 
modern physical plant. (See Appendix 1 for excerpts of man-
agement comments). 
U.S. Steel's accompanying financial statements, however, 
provided inadequate numerical signals of the extent to which 
obsolescence was eroding their physical capital base. Compari-
son of annual capital additions with the concurrent depreciation 
charges, graphically depicted in Figure 2, might erroneously 
suggest that U.S. Steel maintained an expanding productive 
capital posture throughout the post World War II era. Apparent 
declines in productive capacity were only portrayed in periods 
when emergency facilities were being amortized (1941-1945 and 
1954-1956) or in the initial stages of the recognition of acceler-
ated depreciation (1962-1965). 
By 1967, the accounting numbers suggested that the com-
pany had begun to rapidly expand its productive capacity. 
Three years later management sought to confirm this image 
with the following comments: 
"Although it will be another year or two before 
some major units are fully operational, almost every 
area of our steel operations has now been substan-
tially upgraded . . . Our job now is to obtain the vol-
ume required to utilize the full productive capa-
bilities of all our facilities by participating fully in the 
growing markets for steel" [U.S. Steel, 1970, p. 2]. 
However, closer analysis of Figure 2 shows that the shift in 
the reported accounting numbers was due, in part , to the change 
in depreciation methods. In 1968, the straight-line method 
reduced depreciation charges by $94.0 million.6 If the losses 
associated with the plant closures are ignored, U.S. Steel ex-
pended almost twice as many funds for plant additions ($11.2 
billion) as they expensed as depreciation ($5.8 billion) during 
the sixteen-year period that followed the change in depreciation 
methods. 
6No cumulative catchup adjustment was shown on the income statement. 
APB #20 which would have required disclosure was not implement until 1971. 
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Figure 2 
Capital Additions minus Depreciation 
Actual Reported Numbers 
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Not only did U.S. Steel extend the useful life of its assets, 
but throughout the 1970s, the company also periodically recog-
nized depreciation that was below the amount which would 
have been required had production been maintained at the 
presumed ideal level of 85 percent of capacity. The company's 
depreciation policy assumed that physical factors such as wear 
and tear resulting from the operation of the assets, should be the 
major limiting factor in determining depreciation. In reality, 
economic factors such as technological obsolescence might have 
provided a better prediction of the rate at which an asset was 
losing its service potential. 
U.S. Steel's financial statements did not reflect the contrac-
tion and retrenchment that were occurring in plant capacity 
until 1984 after the bulk of the plant closings had been consum-
mated. At that time, plant additions declined drastically and 
remained insignificant thereafter. (See Appendix 2 for a brief 
discussion of the factors cited by U.S. Steel as causing the 
company's loss of its historical share of the global steel market.) 
Historical Cost — Uniform Useful Economic Life Assumption 
Existing plant assets will become outmoded as improved, 
more efficient machines or processes become available. To 
remain competitive, a company must constantly replace old 
physical assets with new technologies, well before the replaced 
assets reach the end of their physical lives. In a highly indus-
trialized, technology-oriented economy, technological impair-
ment will be steady and very persistent. The systematic periodic 
recognition of a uniform amount of depreciation regardless of 
the actual physical decline that an asset might actually suffer 
offers an indication of the process by which a company's plant 
capacity becomes outmoded. 
Table 3 compares actual depreciation with standardized 
depreciation to show the effect of a uniform depreciation policy. 
It gives some indication of the bias generated when either the 
depreciation method or useful life assumption is altered. The 
impact on the financial statements of not maintaining a consis-
tent depreciation policy is graphically presented in Figure 3, 
which depicts the cumulative difference between recorded de-
preciation plus the actual write-offs and depreciation charges 
based on a fifteen-year life straight-line assumption. 
From the outbreak of World War II through 1957, U.S. Steel 
appears to have recognized excess depreciation charges (com-
pared to the standardized series) in the financial statements. 
15
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Table 3 
Comparison of Actual Depreciation 
With a Fifteen-Year Life Assumption 
Straight-Line Depreciation 
Actual Over< Under> 
Standardized 
Reported Fifteen-Year 
Years Depreciation Assumption Period Cumulative 
1939-1947 $ 930,329 $ 716,157 $ 214,172 $ 214,172 
1948-1957 2,119,816 1,685,872 433,944 648,116 
1958-1967 2,793,832 3,264,519 ( 470,687) 177,429 
1968-1977 3,199,500 4,437,863 ( 1,238,363) ( 1,060,934) 
1978-1987 6,369,600* 6,505,999 ( 136,399) ( 1,197,333) 
* Includes major write-offs 
During this period the company utilized various accelerated 
methods to amortize the emergency facilities constructed for 
World War II and the Korean Conflict. From 1963 through 1967, 
financial s tatement recognition of a 7 percent investment tax 
credit and the 20 percent double-declining-balance depreciation 
allowed under IRS Revenue Procedure 61-21 caused reported 
depreciation and standardized depreciation to be quite similar. 
(The five-year difference was only $31,138,000.) In 1968, how-
ever, U.S. Steel returned to reporting straight-line depreciation; 
thereafter, the company consistently underestimated deprecia-
tion expense. By 1978, just prior to the initial announcement of a 
major plant closing, cumulative underestimates exceeded $1 
billion. From 1979 through the end of the study in 1987, asset 
write-downs and reported depreciation roughly equaled esti-
mated straight-line fifteen-year estimated depreciation, but in-
dividual years were markedly different. 
Replacement Cost — Uniform Useful Life Assumption 
The final economic series utilized to depict depreciation 
expense not only assumes that all property, plant, and equip-
ment is depreciated over a uniform fifteen-year life, but further 
standardizes the write-off of the service potential inherent in 
such assets by restating historical costs to replacement costs. 
The revision of property, plant, and equipment to reflect the 
estimated costs that would be incurred if assets with similar 
service potential were purchased at current prices, allows the 
reader to more accurately estimate any remaining productive 
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Figure 3 
Cumulative Difference Between Actual Depreciation 
plus Writeoffs and Straight-line (15 yr. Assumption) 
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capacity, because fully depreciated assets (formerly reported at 
low historical costs) are weighted identically after restatement 
to recent purchases (at higher prices) of productive assets.7 
Table 4 summarizes historical cost fifteen-year life assumption 
depreciation expense restated in current prices (regular depre-
ciation) and current year changes in replacement costs of 
previously depreciated service potential (catchup depreciation). 
Table 4 
Summary of Replacement Cost Depreciation 
Replacement Cost Depreciation 
Years 
1939-1947 
1948-1957 
1958-1967 
1968-1977 
1978-1987 
Regular 
$ 958,985 
2,423,510 
4,381,298 
7,199,059 
10,969,516 
Catchup 
$ 1,886,052 
3,121,072 
3,720,838 
15,071,021 
14,633,148 
Catchup as 
Percentage of 
Regular Depreciation 
196.7% 
128.8% 
84.9% 
209.3% 
133.4% 
Old (totally depreciated) assets will require the recognition 
of significant amounts of catchup depreciation, particularly in 
periods of increasing costs, as evidenced in this case by increases 
in the ENR Construction Cost Index. Estimates of such changes 
in the probable future sacrifices, which would be required to 
replenish current operating capacity of fully depreciated assets, 
are not readily available when such assets are only measured in 
the original prices incurred to construct the assets. These 
valuation problems become more pronounced as assets age and 
the percentage of fully depreciated capacity becomes significant 
relative to total capacity. 
From 1968 when U.S. Steel began utilizing straight-line 
depreciation through 1983 when the fourth round of permanent 
plant shutdowns was consummated, annual catchp deprecia-
tion was, on the average, twice as large (201.5%) as regular 
replacement cost depreciation. After this point in time, annual 
catchup depreciation dropped dramatically in importance to be 
considerably smaller (28.5%) than regular depreciation. These 
numbers offer a striking contrast to the image of a rapidly 
expanding physical capacity as depicted in the historical cost 
depreciation series. Between 1968 and 1983, U.S. Steel reported 
that capital additions were $4,240 million in excess of actual 
recorded historical cost depreciation (see Figure 2 and Table 2). 
7See Appendix 1 for further explanation. 
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When asset life is held constant, only changes in the 
amounts needed to replace productive capacity will cause re-
placement cost depreciation to differ from historical cost depre-
ciation. Figure 4, which graphically overlays the ENR Construc-
tion Cost Index on the annual restatement of depreciation in 
current costs, portrays the impact of changing construction 
costs on depreciation recognition. 
In general, changes in construction costs varied directly 
with the variance in replacement cost and historical cost depre-
ciation under a fifteen-year asset life assumption. Two signifi-
cant increases in the costs of construction — one immediately 
following the end of World War II and the second during the 
build-up and fighting in Vietnam — were followed in the 
subsequent years by a widening of the gap between replacement 
cost and historical cost depreciation. In the years between 
World War II and Vietnam, the steel industry experienced 
relatively small changes in the cost of construction. In particu-
lar, the U.S. Steel fixed asset accounts reflected few changes in 
depreciation expense restated for the fifteen-year life assump-
tion. The two series converged only during one period. In 1972, 
spiraling construction costs began to abate. Yet replacement 
cost depreciation as a percentage of historical cost depreciation 
continued to widen for ten years. This ratio only began to 
improve in 1984, when construction cost changes began a sharp 
decline. 
Which method of recording depreciation best reflects 
changes that have occurred in current productive capacity? The 
impact of the three alternative methods of valuing depreciation 
are discussed in the next section to highlight the effectiveness of 
each in linking capital values to prediction of future cash flows. 
COMPARISON OF REPORTED INVESTING ACTIVITIES 
Iron Age [January 30, 1964] asked the following question: 
"Is the steel industry being too cautious in its capital speeding?" 
They answered their own question by saying: "Steel spending is 
high. But it still just about equals depreciation." From 1939 
through 1987, U.S. Steel recorded a five-fold increase in the 
value of its capital assets and capital additions were approxi-
mately $4 billion more than depreciation changes. This would 
suggest that U.S. Steel had been able to expand its productive 
capacity. Yet capacity during this same period declined from a 
reported high in 1959 of 41.9 million to 19.2 million tons in 1987. 
Was the decline in physical capacity as abrupt as historical cost 
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Figure 4 
Comparison Of Change In ENR Construction Cost Index With 
CC Depreciation/HC Depreciation (15 yr.)1 
1Left axis applies to change in ENR construction cost index and right axis 
applies to change in CC/HC depreciation. 
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figures would suggest, or did a gradual aging process occur? 
Which depreciation valuation method provides the clearest 
signals that productive capacity was being eroded? Figure 5 
pictorially compares Annual Replacement Indexes measured in 
historical costs with those calculated with replacement costs. 
Figure 5 
Annual Replacement Indexes 
1939-1987 
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From the end of World War II until 1983 when U.S. Steel was 
involved extensively in the plant shutdown program, the re-
ported historical cost numbers presented a persistent pattern of 
annual new capital expenditures being well in excess of the 
annual recognition of facility wear and tear. Only for two short 
periods (1954-1955 and 1962-1964) did capital additions fail to 
exceed depreciation charges. The first disruption of apparent 
steady expansion occurred immediately following the Korean 
War after an extensive program of modernization and expansion 
was completed. Tax savings, precipitated by the accelerated 
write-off of these emergency facilities, aided in the financing of 
the construction. 
The years 1963 through 1965 marked the second period when 
construction expenditures did not outpace historical cost depre-
ciation. Shifts in demand from heavy to light products were 
occurring, and domestic steel producers were starting to feel 
pressure from foreign imports. During this period, new facilities 
authorizations began to reflect a change in emphasis at U.S. Steel 
toward light, flat rolled steels. This shift culminated in August, 
1965, when an enlarged $1.8 billion facilities program was 
announced. For the next seventeen years capital expenditures 
completely outpaced recognition of wear and tear. Yet produc-
tive capacity declined from approximately 42 to 31 million tons. 
The Annual Replacement Indexes revalued in current re-
placement costs provide a different picture of capacity expansion 
and contraction at U.S. Steel. With historical costs, capacity 
expansion did not appear to cease until 1983. In contrast, a bleak 
picture begins to emerge as early as 1961 when replacement costs 
are utilized. Thereafter, current capital expenditures are greater 
than depreciation charges, valued also in current costs, only in 
1967-1969 and again briefly in 1976. 
Comparison of the reported historical cost Net Asset Ratios 
with the replacement cost Net Asset Ratios (Figure 6) provides 
confirmatory evidence of the signal differences obtained from the 
two economic series. Undepreciated assets as a percentage of 
total assets give some indication of the age of the physical plant. 
Again historical costs ratios offer a much more positive image of 
the company's ability to maintain physical capacity over the 
years than does the alternative measure. Historical cost data 
suggest that U.S. Steel was able to modernize the plant between 
1965 and 1980 (Net Asset Ratios increased from 37.7 to 46.3). 
Using replacement costs, one could at best only infer that U.S. 
Steel was holding its own. (The ratio declined slightly from 21.1 
to 20.1). In 1983, historical cost Net Asset Ratios abruptly began 
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deteriorating from a high of 46.5 to 32.7 in 1987. Such rapid 
swings are not observed in the replacement cost numbers for this 
period. (Comparable Net Asset Ratios were 25.6 and 25.8, 
respectively.) 
Figure 6 
Net Asset Ratios 
1939-1987 
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Figures 7 and 8 provide additional information pertaining 
to the annual changes in the reported historical cost and 
replacement cost Net Asset Ratios. 
Figure 7 
Annual Change in Net Fixed Assets/Gross Fixed Assets 
Historical Cost — Actual Depreciation 
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Figure 8 
Annual Change in Net Fixed Assets/Gross Fixed Assets 
Replacement Cost — 15 yr. Assumption 
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Net Asset Ratios calculated with reported financial state-
ment numbers suggested that U.S. Steel experienced from time 
to time fairly large changes in the average age of the physical 
plant. Significant ratio declines occurred twice — once during 
World War II and then again during the Korean Conflict — 
before the plant shutdowns commenced in the 1980s. The early 
"plant agings" simply reflected changes in the company's de-
preciation policy. The latter decline arose because previously 
underdepreciated assets were being abandoned. When replace-
ment costs were utilized to develop the Net Asset Ratios, similar 
large negative shifts did not arise. Asset aging, particularly for 
the two decades beginning in 1960, appeared to be more gradual 
and more persistent. 
One profitability measure — Return on Net Fixed Assets — 
was calculated to provide some indication of the bias inherent in 
the reported financial statements concerning management 's 
effectiveness in using company plant assets to generate net 
income. Figure 9 contrasts U.S. Steel's reported historical cost 
return on investment with indexes computed on a replacement 
cost basis. 
Historical cost indexes paint quite a different picture of 
long-term company performance than do numbers adjusted for 
replacement costs. U.S. Steel's reported financial statements 
created an illusion of prosperity. The company's "maintenance" 
investment policy maximized short-term profits; but, by the end 
of the period, U.S. Steel had completely lost its competitive 
advantage. The existing financial reporting system encouraged 
this orderly liquidation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examined the extant accounting practices for 
depreciation over a fifty-year span as conveyed through the 
financial statements of one company — U.S. Steel. Several 
conclusions, which deal in general with the accounting for 
depreciation and specifically with the information communi-
cated by U.S. Steel, are offered. 
General Conclusions: 
1) Altering the accounting techniques used to convey informa-
tion about an economic series can alter the picture conveyed 
to the statement user. 
2) When prices are changing and/or new technology emerges, 
the use of replacement cost numbers to value current services 
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Figure 9 
Return On Investment 
1939-1987 
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obtained from property, plant and equipment and to esti-
mate any remaining future service potential will more 
rapidly convey subtle changes in productive physical capac-
ity and more accurately predict fu ture reduct ions in 
acknowledged physical capacity. 
Specific Conclusions Relating to U.S. Steel: 
1) In the past fifty years, recorded depreciation has not resulted 
entirely from a cost allocation process whereby the cost of an 
asset was systematically allocated to the periods during 
which it would be used. Economic factors not related to 
matching revenues with related expenses had a significant 
impact on the annual depreciation charge recorded by U.S. 
Steel. 
2) Current tax law, not changes in plant capacity utilization or 
concern with matching the periodic expiration of physical 
plant service potential with the periodic revenue generated 
by the company assets, governed the corporate recognition of 
depreciation. 
3) Depreciation can be standardized so that the original cost is 
systematically allocated over a predetermined number of 
periods. Yet changing prices, particularly those incurred for 
the construction or purchase of long-lived assets, cause 
allocations of past costs to be poor predictors of future cash 
inflows from the sale of goods or future cash outflows for the 
purchase of new technology. 
4) Recognition of the cost of replacing productive assets in the 
cost allocation process, provides the clearest signal of 
gradual changes which are occurring in a company's ability 
to maintain or even enhance its physical capacity to produce 
future goods or services. 
5) Examination of replacement cost numbers suggest that U.S. 
Steel made a decision about 1960 to not commit itself to a 
total conversion or recapitalization in the technology newly 
emerging at that time. Current and anticipated resources 
simply were not available. U.S. Steel alternatively initiated a 
smaller, and thus less risky, program of partial conversion to 
the new technology. Concurrently, the old technology plants 
continued to profitably produce output (at least in historical 
cost terms) with the capital in place. Variable costs (par-
ticularly labor) gradually increased over time without a 
concomitant improvement in output per man-hour. Finally, 
two decades later, the price of the output being created with 
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the old technology could not offset current cash outlays for 
variable costs and U.S. Steel could no longer economically 
justify maintaining operations. In 1978, U.S. Steel initiated a 
program which ultimately resulted in the permanent closing 
of almost 50 percent of its reported capacity. 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985) defines a 
language as being any "systematic means of communicating 
ideas or feelings by the use of conventionalized signs, sounds, 
gestures, or marks having understood meanings." Accounting 
represents a language whereby ideas are conveyed with num-
bers. U.S. Steel, through its annual financial statements, im-
parted information to its statement users both with numbers (in 
the actual financial statements) and with words (in the man-
agement comments attached to the financial statements). One 
conveyed a message of ongoing prosperity. The other conveyed a 
message of impending doom. The negative message ultimately 
proved to be the correct one. Yet there is little indication that it 
was heeded by those who could have altered the path that U.S. 
Steel followed. 
The experiences of U.S. Steel bring three questions to mind. 
Was the verbal message repeatedly given by company manage-
ment ignored because the accounting message being trans-
mitted offered too different a picture? Could the accounting 
message have been couched in different terms which would have 
added emphasis to U.S. Steel management 's verbal warnings? 
Are other similar warnings going unheeded today because 
historical cost numbers simply do not accurately reflect the 
underlying economic events? Additional research into this area 
certainly seems advisable. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Excerpts from Annual Reports of U.S. Steel 
1939 — "[Depreciation and depletion of property is an inescapable cost ele-
ment in production and, unless an adequate sum can be currently set 
aside to cover these unseen costs, the corporation might at some future 
time find that its facilities had been worn out or depleted and that 
provision for their replacement has not been made" [p. 12]. 
1947 — "It is a simple fact that to buy similar tools of production takes many 
more dollars today than formerly; to count as profits, rather than as 
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cost, the added sums required merely to sustain production is to 
retreat from reality into self-deception" [p. 14]. 
1954 — "Depreciation amounts as ordinarily calculated and recognized in tax 
laws . . . have failed to perform their vital revolving-fund function of 
maintaining the supply and modernness of the tools of production. The 
reason for this: The total number of dollars that can be recovered in 
depreciation over the life of a given facility is limited to the number of 
dollars originally expended for the facility. But the buying power of the 
dollar has not remained at all stable . . . If depreciation cost is under-
stated in current buying power, then income is correspondingly over-
stated . . . This is unfair and unfortunate because it results in the 
taxation of capital" [pp. 23-24]. 
1956 — "[The current Federal taxation system] may be regarded as the hidden 
taxation of capital as it turns over through depreciation or, alterna-
tively, as a hidden increase in the tax rate on true income . . . The 
prospect is that the portion of reported income that must be regarded 
as "phantom" income, because it is required to maintain the business 
under conditions of continuing inflation, will increase . . . As basic 
costs continue to be forced upward, and as the depreciation deficiency 
widens, management's problem of finding the dollars required to 
maintain the business becomes more acute" [pp. 27-28]. 
1960 — "The part that government can constructively play in promoting the 
growth process is strictly limited, but the part it can play in preventing 
growth is virtually unlimited . . . [The government's] tax and regulat-
ory powers can be used to destory utterly the incentive and ability to 
save and productively invest that are essential to growth. [Under the 
current tax code, the calculation of depreciation] must be based on the 
prices paid years ago — twenty-five years or more in the case of U.S. 
Steel . . . The deficiency amount which should realistically be regarded 
as depreciation is thus treated as income and on that pretense over half 
of it is taxed away. This is more than inimical to growth; it puts a tax 
on just staying even" [pp. 26-28]. 
1966 — "Capital is, in a word, tools — everything invested to further produc-
tion . . . Facility modernization and product innovations blur, even 
obliterate, the line of distinction between replacement and expansion 
of capacity . . . The financing of replacement should be covered by 
adequate depreciation . . . There is thus need for realistic depreciation 
allowances, geared to both the acceleration of obsolescence and to the 
inflationary erosion of the dollar" [pp. 33-38]. 
1969 — "The current tax formula is based on charges for depreciation of 
dollars invested in the past. But because of inflation, these dollars have 
less buying power today, and thus the depreciation allowed is too 
small even to maintain existing investment . . . As the widening gap 
between return of capital needed and that allowed is taxed as profits, 
the real tax rate rises and the incentive to invest falls" [pp. 37-38]. 
1976 — "Because of the long lives over which our investment in facilities is 
required to be recovered, inflation exacts a heavy toll. The purchasing 
power of the dollars recovered through depreciation, therefore, is but a 
fraction of the amount actually needed to replace the equipment" [p. 5]. 
1980 — "Present tax laws limit depreciation to the original cost of facilities . . . 
[This] means that only part of the cost of replacing worn out facilities 
can be recovered as a cost of doing business . . . Confiscation of private 
property was never contemplated by Congress. Yet, confiscation is 
31
Reed: Historical analysis of depreciation accounting -- The United States Steel experience
Published by eGrove, 1989
150 The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1989 
occurring at an accelerated pace. Inflation, when combined with our 
existing tax laws, is the cause. Tax reform to alleviate the effects of 
inflation — through faster write-off of plant and equipment — is no 
longer simply desirable, it is imperative" [pp. 33-34], 
APPENDIX 2 
Discussion of Factors Cited by U.S. Steel 
U.S. Steel cited three factors, beyond the Federal tax policy, as exacerbat-
ing their ability to retain their historical share of the global steel market. The 
company faced intense pressures internally from labor and the Federal gov-
ernment and externally from foreign steel producers. Management suggested 
that these pressures ultimately played an important role in U.S. Steel's deci-
sion to reduce its steel-making operations. 
Union Pressure 
U.S. Steel experienced persistent union pressure for increased wages and 
benefits. During the 1950s, a cycle of union demands which were not subject to 
"dickering or compromise," strikes, and compromises brought successively 
larger wage increases, insurance and pension benefits, vacation pay and au-
tomatic cost of living adjustments to the worker. 
In 1956 the Company noted, "For the best part of two decades, U.S. Steel's 
employment cost per employee hour . . . [has] advanced at a rate, compounded 
annually, averaging 8.1% . . . [T]he vast power of industry-wide labor unions in 
compelling annual increases in employment costs far beyond increases in 
productivity is automatically compelling inflation" [p. 25]. And, in 1959, "The 
long-term increase in output/man-hour (since 1940) has been equivalent to only 
a little over 2% per annum" [p. 29]. 
Even though the frequency of extended work stoppages declined in the 
subsequent years, wages continued to rise, but productivity did not improve. 
U.S. Steel warned in 1979. 
"Labor cost must be competitive. Higher labor rates can be justified only if 
that labor is more productive and can provide a product or service which 
is competitive . . . No nation or company can long survive if the price and 
productivity of its labor is noncompetitive . . . Since the early seventies, 
there has been little productivity improvement in steel . . . For the coming 
decade, it is quite clear that collective bargaining improvements must be 
earned by improved productivity" [p. 14]. 
And again in 1982. 
"The only alternative to the permanent loss of both steel mills and 
steelworker jobs was a moderation in labor costs to bring them more into 
line with those of other manufacturing workers" [p. 3]. 
The escalation in hourly wage costs did not subside until 1983 after steel 
plants had begun to be permanently idled. In 1982, the average hourly wage of 
steelworkers was $21.61, which represented a 1,579 percent increase over the 
1945 average hourly wage of $1,287. The Consumer Price Index during this 
same period increased only 436 percent. 
A significant wage reduction was finally achieved in 1986, after steel plants 
had been idled by a six-month strike. 
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"We were determined to get a competitive labor settlement which would 
give our steel business a fighting chance to survive in a tough marketplace. 
Although we had to endure a six-month strike, we attained our objective" 
[p. 4]. 
Government Pressure 
Throughout the fifty years of the study, the Federal government also 
applied extensive pressure on U.S. Steel; first, to hold down prices, and later, 
to comply with environmental standards. Several company comments relating 
to government pressure follow. 
Price Controls: 
1945 — "Price controls in peacetime is a simple denial to customers of 
their right to bring about and to support production of the goods 
and services they want . . . Price and cost changes that significantly 
narrow profit margins inevitably repel investment and employ-
ment in additional production" [p. 24]. 
1952 — "[Since the start of World War II, one of the] principal devices 
employed to undermine the profit incentive has been the virtually 
continuous direct or indirect imposition of ceilings on steel prod-
uct prices during a period when Federal fiscal and monetary 
policies were debasing the buying power of everybody's dollars" 
[p. 24]. 
1958 — "He who would squeeze income reinvested to increase wages, taxes 
or other costs, or to reduce prices, would be squeezing out . . . the 
most immediate and direct means that exists of financing and 
expanding industrial capacity, important in peacetime and essen-
tial in wartime" [p. 29]. 
1964 — "Steel prices are virtually the same as six years earlier" [p. 5]. 
1973 — "On January 25, 1974, the Cost of Living Council granted what was 
for U.S. Steel a very nominal increase in pricing authority on steel 
products against the substantial cost increase incurred since 1972" 
[p. 2]. 
Environmental Regulations: 
1973 — "We believe the time has come when environmentalists at all 
levels must carefully weigh the full costs of further pollution 
abatement against the probable benefits, particularly where elimi-
nation of the final insignificant percentage of contaminants may be 
several times as costly and use many times as much energy as 
eliminating the first 99%" [p. 16]. 
1975 — "In today's climate, some governmental regulations are so restric-
tive and so costly to apply that it may be impossible to add the 
needed new capacity and thus provide additional job opportunities 
. . . It is not technologically or economically feasible to operate 
many facilities for the production of steel . . . with no emissions" 
[p. 6]. 
1977 — "A factor significantly restricting the Corporation's ability to in-
vest in job-producing tools for the future is the mounting pressure 
for retrofitting of older facilities with sophisticated and highly 
expensive environmental control facilities . . . The economics of 
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[capital investments to comply with the implementation of en-
vironmental laws] may, at the time they are to be made, dictate 
that certain facilities be abandoned instead of modified to comply 
with the requirements" [p. 21]. 
In 1979, the company noted that it had invested $2.1 billion in the past five 
years in investments to reduce steelworking costs and $.6 billion for nonincome 
producing environmental facilities. 
Foreign Pressure 
In the late 1950s, U.S. Steel began to experience pressure from abroad as 
well as at home, as foreign steel at extremely competitive prices began to enter 
the country. At its peak, in 1984, imports comprised 26.4 percent of the 
domestic market. 
Company management described this problem in the following ways. 
1959 — "There is increasing competition from other steel producers, both 
in the U.S. and in foreign countries, from other materials such as 
aluminum and plastics, and from technological advances which 
affect materials requirements throughout industry" [pp. 11-12]. 
1961 —"Foreign producers with recreated modern capacities are increas-
ingly able to compete with American producers in international 
markets . . . America is costing itself out of foreign markets, and 
out of the jobs of producing for them, while foreign producers are 
invading our domestic markets . . . [If] the cost inflation remains 
unhalted, it seems quite clear that we will not be able to balance 
what we buy or give abroad with what we sell or get from abroad" 
[p. 29]. 
1964 — "For the first six decades of the 20th century, the U.S. economy 
was an exporter of steel mill products. Starting in 1959 and in 
every year since, imports of steel mill products have exceeded 
exports . . . Much of the steel imported from foreign countries into 
this country has been sold at prices substantially below those 
prevailing both in their own domestic markets and in the U.S. 
markets" [p. 37]. 
1967 — "Prices of foreign steel sold in the United States are substantially 
below U.S. domestic prices. Limited data available indicate that 
price differences arise primarily because of the large cost advan-
tage — principally employment costs — enjoyed by foreign steel-
makers [p. 18] . . . Many foreign producers have an added advan-
tage because the installed costs of new facilities abroad are far less 
than in the United States. (Due to pollution control equipment 
requirements) [p. 20] . . . U.S. import vulnerability inceases when 
and where low foreign wages are accompanied by productive 
capability and capital availability" [p. 35]. 
1978 — "Many of these imports were dumped here at . . . prices below 
their costs, or below what they sell the same products for in their 
own countries. Dumping hurts the domestic steel industry and the 
American economy through lost jobs, sales and profits . . . Today, 
the U.S. is the only industrialized nation unable to supply its own 
steel needs. If solutions are not found, we will become even more 
dependent on foreign sources of supply" [p. 6]. 
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Summary 
U.S. Steel was unable to find any workable solution to the wage-price 
squeeze on profits. This, coupled with the fact that their capital base was 
deteriorating, caused the company to become increasingly noncompetitive in 
the international market. After several decades of warnings, U.S. Steel finally 
in the early 1980s began to search for alternative investments. 
1984 — "A New U.S. Steel came into its own in 1984 . . . Today our Oil and 
Gas segment is now our major line of business in terms of both 
revenues and earnings" [p. 2]. 
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